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Abstract
Biofortified foods are being introduced in sub-Saharan Africa as an important strategy to help address micronutrient malnutrition such as vitamin A deficiency. However,
there has been little research on factors that could play decisive roles in the successful introduction of biofortified foods. This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power and health information on consumer acceptance of biofortified orange-fleshed
sweet potato (OFSP) using data from a choice experiment conducted in Ghana. I find
that the OFSP is preferred to the traditional white-fleshed and yellow-fleshed sweet potatoes as indicated by consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the three varieties. I also
find that intra-household bargaining power proxies of education, personal contribution
to household income and amount of land owned as a group, has a negative effect on
consumer acceptance of OFSP. Conversely, providing consumers with information about
the nutritional benefits of OFSP exert a substantial, positive and significant impact on
their acceptance of the produce. Providing nutritional information thus appears to be
more crucial in the successful introduction of OFSP and other biofortified foods.

∗

I would like to thank Elizabeth Katz (my advisor), Bruce Wydick, Alessandra Cassar, Edward Carey,
Jayson Lusk, Ernawati Abidin, Justus Lotade, Simone Tijdink, Dan Gilligan, John Bidzakin, Catherine Meola,
University of San Francisco’s MS International and Development Economics class of 2016, and many others
for useful inputs and assistance with the data collection. Funding from the University of San Francisco and
the International Potato Center, Ghana, is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own.

1

Introduction
The United Nations World Food Programme estimates that over 700 million people in the

world do not have enough food to lead a healthy, active life. Though less obvious, many
more people (more than 2 billion people) are estimated to be suffering from micronutrient
malnutrition (Qaim et al., 2007). A common form of micronutrient malnutrition is vitamin
A deficiency (VAD). VAD causes blindness, impairs growth and cognitive development, and
increases the risk of other infections that can lead to death especially among children and
pregnant and lactating women. It is prevalent among poor households in developing countries
who largely depend on staple food crops for their nutritional needs. Although staple foods
are relatively cheap and rich in calories, they lack essential vitamins and minerals.
The threat posed by VAD has long been recognized, and the world has rallied to combat the scourge. Many international donors and agencies including Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Health Organization (WHO),
among others, have been supportive both at national and global levels to promote efforts to
implement effective and affordable solutions (Rice et al., 2004). Several targeted interventions
are being implemented in Asia, Africa and South America such as provision of micronutrient
supplements, processed food fortification, and more recently biofortification – a term used to
describe a breeding strategy that aims to increase the micronutrient content of staple food
crops (Nestel et al., 2006).
Through biofortification, staple food crops that are enriched with beta-carotene, a precursor of vitamin A in the body, have been bred. Orange-fleshed sweet potato (OFSP) is one of
these crops. Owing to its beta-carotene content, OFSP is orange in color which raises concerns
about its acceptance by consumers relative to traditional sweet potato which is mostly white
in color. However, studies have shown that farmers and consumers are receptive to OFSP
in Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique (Masumba et al., 2007; Tumwegamire et al., 2007;
de Brauw et al., 2013). This finding is consistent with willingness to pay studies conducted by
Chowdhury et al. (2011) and Naico and Lusk (2010), who report that consumers are willing
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to pay for OFSP as much as they would pay for the traditional alternative with similar attributes. Both studies demonstrate that consumers are willing to pay sizable premiums when
informed about the nutritional value of OFSP.
Aside from providing consumers with nutritional information about OFSP and ensuring
that OFSP possesses attributes similar to the traditional alternative, are there other factors
yet to be investigated that can play a crucial role in the success of the OSFP intervention?
As an agricultural intervention with an objective of improving the nutrition and health status
of poor households especially children and women in developing countries, intra-household
bargaining power may play an important role to the success of the OFSP intervention and
the entire biofortification program. Women are the primary caretakers of their households
nutrition and health needs in many developing countries, a position that allows them to
significantly influence household expenditures on food and health. Women have also been
found to have a higher preference than men to spend larger share of the household budget on
food and health given more bargaining power, and this results in positive nutrition and health
outcomes for their household members, particularly their children (Allendorf, 2007; Duflo and
Udry, 2004). In addition, farmer adoption and consumer demand for biofortified crops would
mainly be driven by perceived health and nutritional benefits, which would likely be more
for those farmers and consumers who prefer to spend their resources on food and health, and
whose primary role is to take care of the nutrition and health needs of their households.
Gilligan et al. (2014) investigate the role and importance of gender in biofortification. In
that study, they measure share of land and nonland assets controlled by women as proxy for
bargaining power and find that this does not affect the probability of adopting OFSP. However,
investigating adoption decisions alone encapsulates useful information about women who may
be willing to pay for OFSP but are limited by access to necessary inputs that enable adoption
such as labor, credit and extension services (Doss and Morris, 2001). It is also possible that
cultural norms make the effect of female bargaining power on the acceptance and adoption of
biofortified crops to differ within and across countries. Thus, in contrast to the Gilligan et al.
(2014), I use experimental data to investigate how bargaining power, among other factors,
affects consumer acceptance of OFSP in Ghana, a country where vitamin A deficiency is
3

prevalent among children and women, and where sweet potato is a major staple food.
The following research questions are addressed in this paper: Are Ghanaian consumers
willing to pay for OFSP? What are the determinants of their willingness to pay for OFSP? Is
gender, particularly household bargaining power, a significant determinant of their willingness
to pay for OFSP? What is the effect of providing information about the nutritional benefits
of OFSP on consumers willingness to pay? I use a choice experiment to elicit these responses
from rural consumers in northern and upper east regions of Ghana, and model the responses
with conditional logit. The choice experiment has theoretical foundation on Lancaster (1966)
and econometric foundation on McFadden (1973). However, due to the hypothetical nature of
the choice experiments (the consumers did not actually pay for the sweet potato) conducted
in this study, the total willingness to pay generated in the study could have been overstated
but the marginal willingness to pay seem not to be subject to the same degree of hypothetical
bias (Lusk and Schroeder, 2004). To mitigate hypothetical bias, I adopted “cheap talk” in the
experiment, which was also used by Chowdhury et al. (2011) although they concluded that it
does not seem to entirely eliminate the hypothetical bias.
Keeping the hypothetical bias caveat in mind, I find that Ghanaian consumers are willing
to pay for OFSP, and that they value OFSP more than the white-fleshed sweet potato (WFSP)
and the yellow-fleshed sweet potato (YFSP). The consumers are willing to pay 50 GHC1 /kg
for OFSP, 21 GHC/kg for WFSP and 22 GHC/kg for YFSP. Thus consumers value the OFSP
58% more than the WFSP and 56% more than the YFSP. I also find that bargaining power
proxies of education, personal contribution to household income and amount of land owned
significantly but negatively affect consumer acceptance of OFSP. This result implies that an
increase in any of these proxies will reduce consumer acceptance of OFSP. Thus focusing on
how to increase household bargaining power of women is unlikely to be crucial to the success
of an OFSP intervention and biofortification in general. In contrast, providing consumers
with information about the nutritional benefits of OFSP seem to be a key determinant OFSP
acceptance, as indicated by the large, positive and significant coefficients of information in all
the specified models. This finding suggests that nutritional campaigns should be an integral
1
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part of the OFSP intervention and it could help in asserting or modifying aspects of the
biofortification program to better achieve its intended goals. It also provides useful information
for designing future agricultural programs targeted at women and children. Since the attention
paid to the role of gender in the success of agricultural technologies has been limited, this study
extends the literature in this subfield of research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the advantages of biofortification, and studies on consumer acceptance of biofortified crops as well as studies on
intra-household bargaining power and its effects on development outcomes; Section 3 presents
the methodology for the study, which outlines how the data is collected and the empirical
model and hypothesis; Section 4 focuses on the results of the study and Section 5 presents
the conclusion and implication of the study.

2

Literature Review

2.1

Advantages of Biofortification

Biofortification has been promoted by donors, researchers and policymakers due to its demonstrated potential to combat micronutrient malnutrition. Its advantages over other micronutrient interventions makes it very promising as a sustainable strategy to end micronutrient
malnutrition in the world.
Biofortification is a pro-poor intervention strategy. Since most poor households in developing countries suffer from micronutrient malnutrition and they largely depend on staple food
crops for their nutritional needs, therefore consuming biofortified crops will result in improvements in their nutrition and health status. Due to the predominance of staples in the diets of
the poor, biofortification implicitly targets poor households. Biofortified crops may also serve
as nutritional buffer during economic shocks because the poor normally reduce their intake of
higher-value food commodities when adverse events occur (Qaim et al., 2007).
In addition to being a pro-poor intervention, biofortification is highly cost-effective compared to other micronutrient malnutrition interventions (Meenakshi et al., 2010). The recurrent costs of biofortification is quite low because after the initial outlay of investments on
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seeds, germplasm can be shared internationally and farmers can easily disperse the planting
materials and varieties to their extended families, friends or neighbors at little or no additional
costs (Mwaniki, 2009). It is estimated that $80 million will be enough to fund the research, development, dissemination, and evaluation of six biofortified staple crops to be used indefinitely
in the world while the same amount of money cannot provide regular vitamin A supplements
to 7% of the South Asian population (Stevens and Winter-Nelson, 2008).
Other micronutrient interventions such as processed food fortification and provision of
supplements tend to focus on urban markets while biofortification reaches out to rural areas
where most dwellers are farmers. Most farmers consume part of their produce, so continuous
supply of nutritious crops is ensured for farmers who adopt biofortified crops. If farmers adopt
biofortified crops, there may be no need for them to seek for free micronutrient supplements or
purchase processed food that are fortified with micronutrients which are only easily accessed
in the urban areas. Biofortification can therefore be used as a solitary intervention or as a
complement to other interventions which are readily available in urban areas.
Biofortification also has the advantage of eliminating the risk of toxicity especially in the
case of vitamin A. Poisoning by excess consumption of processed food fortified with micronutrients or massive doses of supplements is avoided through the consumption of biofortified
crops (Stevens and Winter-Nelson, 2008). Furthermore, breeding micronutrient dense crops
does not incur any penalty in terms of the agronomic characteristics of the crop, particularly
with regards to yield and resilience to pests and diseases. Instead, nutrient-packed crops are
more likely to resist diseases and survive environmental stresses. This implies that farmers
have nothing to lose by adopting biofortified staple crops.

2.2

Consumer Acceptance of Biofortified Foods

The acceptance of biofortified foods is influenced by a number of factors that can be broadly
grouped into technology efficacy and technology coverage (Qaim et al., 2007). Technology
efficacy involves the micronutrient content of a biofortified crop, its micronutrient retention
ability after processing and the bioavailability of the micronutrient when it is consumed.
Many studies (Haas et al., 2011; Hotz et al., 2012; Low et al., 2007; van Jaarsveld et al., 2005;
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Van Jaarsveld et al., 2006) confirm the efficacy of biofortified staple crops in combating micronutrient malnutrition while a growing literature investigates issues of technology coverage.
Technology coverage entails farmer adoption and consumer acceptance of biofortified staple
crops. Biofortification could be carried out by conventional breeding or by genetic modification as in the case of golden rice. But due to strong opposition to genetic modification, there
seems to be more focus on those staple crops that are biofortified through conventional breeding (González et al., 2009). However, accepting biofortified crops that are conventionally bred
may require a change in the behaviour of farmers and consumers since some of the biofortified
crops differ in colour and texture relative to the traditional staple crops.
One of the staple crops that has been enriched with beta-carotene is maize. Stevens and
Winter-Nelson (2008) examine the acceptance of provitamin A maize in Mozambique. Using
taste tests and a trading experiment, they find that participants in their experiment ranked the
appearance of their local white maize over an orange biofortified variety. They also find that
the existing preferences for white maize do not preclude acceptance of the orange biofortified
variety since a large share of the participants showed willingness to consume meals made with
the orange biofortified maize. However, the study was conducted in the urban area – in the
city of Maputo – which might affect its external validity especially in the case of biofortification
which is a pro-poor and pro-rural intervention. De Groote et al. (2011) estimate consumer
willingness to pay for yellow and fortified maize in both rural and urban regions of Kenya
using experimental auctions. Their results show that consumers in Kenya are willing to pay
premiums for fortified maize even though there was a general preference for the white maize
over the fortified maize. Nonetheless, they also find that the preference of white maize over
the yellow maize is less pronounced in western Kenya and that consumers in Siaya district of
Kenya actually prefer the fortified yellow maize over white maize.
Another staple food crop that has been biofortified with beta-carotene is cassava. Cassava
is important to the welfare of about one billion people in developing countries who depend on it
for their food, livestock feed and industrial needs (Jansen van Rijssen et al., 2013). Biofortified
cassava seem to be well received in Brazil, where González et al. (2009) investigate consumers
attitudes toward the hypothetical product. Using a combination of choice experiment and
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contingent valuation techniques to improve the robustness of their results, they estimate mean
willingness to pay for vitamin A biofortified cassava at 60-70 per cent above market prices for
traditional cassava. They also find that consumers value the white attribute of cassava over
the yellow attribute of the biofortified variety but the product as a whole is well received as
indicated by the high mean willingness to pay obtained. However, they based their analysis on
stated preference data which is prone to hypothetical bias, so placing particular confidence on
the exact WTP numbers might be misleading. Using experimental auctions, Oparinde et al.
(2014) investigate consumer WTP for a product made from biofortified yellow cassava (garri)
and the effect of nutritional information on consumer WTP for the product in two states of
Nigeria that exhibit distinct habitual product colour differences. They find that consumers are
less likely to pay for garri in Imo (in the southeast) while in Oyo (in the southwest) consumers
are willing to pay a premium for the yellow cassava. In both states, they find that nutritional
information results in a price premium for biofortified yellow cassava.
Sweet potato, a widely consumed staple crop in both developed and developing countries, is
one of the first staple crops to be biofortified with beta-carotene. Chowdhury et al. (2011) and
Naico and Lusk (2010) use data from choice experiments to study consumer acceptance and
their willingness to pay for OFSP in Uganda and Mozambique respectively. Chowdhury et al.
(2011) find that consumers in Uganda are willing to pay sizable premiums when informed
about the nutritional value of OFSP. Even in the absence of nutritional information, they
find that consumers are willing to pay for OFSP as much as they are willing to pay to the
traditional white sweet potatoes. They find that some of the determinants of willingness to
pay include taste and demographics. Similarly, Naico and Lusk (2010) find that consumers
in Mozambique value the pulp of the OFSP more than the traditional variety. Attributes
valued by the consumers include dry matter content and the size of roots. Furthermore, they
find that nutritional information about OFSP boosts acceptance and possible consumption
of OFSP in urban areas more than in the rural areas. Both studies conclude that OFSP has
great potential to compete successfully in the market against traditional sweet potatoes.
An emerging theme in the above literature is the important role nutritional information
plays in the acceptance of biofortified crops. But none of the studies mentioned above, except
8

Oparinde et al. (2014), was conducted in West Africa, a region with one of the worst records
of micronutrient malnutrition. This necessitates studies that will help in establishing the
external validity of current studies and that will further investigate other factors that can
also influence the success of biofortification. One of such factors might be intra-household
bargaining power of women. This study uses experimental data to study the determinants of
consumer willingness to pay for OFSP.

2.3

Intra-household Bargaining and Development

The main objective of most researchers studying women’s bargaining power is to causally link it
with a range of development outcomes. Doss (2013) broadly group key development outcomes
that are affected by increases in women’s bargaining power into consumption and expenditure
(Quisumbing and de La Brière, 2000; Doss, 2006), production (Udry, 1996; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008; Von Braun, 1988), labor allocation (Zhang and Chan, 1999), children’s health
and education outcomes (Rahman, 2013; Gitter and Barham, 2008; Smith, 2003; Allendorf,
2007), women’s health (Beegle et al., 2001; Grown et al., 2005; Li and Wu, 2011) and decision
making and perception (Allendorf, 2007; Connelly et al., 2010).
The following review focuses on women’s and children’s health and well-being due to the
purposes of this study. Allendorf (2007) uses data from the 2001 Nepal Demographic and
Health Survey to investigate whether women’s land rights promotes empowerment and child
health. His results show that women land ownership promote the role of women in household
decisions and this significantly reduces the likelihood of their children being underweight.
Beegle et al. (2001) examine the effect of Indonesian women’s power relative to their husbands
on the use of prenatal and delivery care. They find that a woman’s bargaining power proxied as
her control over some economic resources of her household and level of education influences her
reproductive health decisions. In particular, their results suggest that, on average, if a woman
owns assets and is educated, she is more likely to receive prenatal care during pregnancy
compared to other women. Their results also imply that the amount of assets owned by a
woman increases the chances that a woman gives birth in a hospital or at a private doctor’s
office, and that if she gives birth at home, she is likely to have a trained midwife in attendance.
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Aside from assets and level of education, Beegle et al. (2001) also use two other measure of
bargaining power, social status of women’s families and level of education of their fathers
relative to their husbands, to demonstrate that these factors are linked to increases in the
likelihood of using prenatal services and delivering at a health center or midwife’s office.
Li and Wu (2011) use data from China Health and Nutrition survey to show that a woman
with a first-born son (measure of relative bargaining power within the household) is more
likely to have a greater role in household decision-making, be better nourished and is less
likely to be underweight relative to a woman that has a first-born daughter. Ross et al. (2015)
investigate the health effects of women empowerment in agriculture using a data set from
a survey in Northern Ghana. They find that measures of women’s empowerment, including
ownership of assets, access to credit, autonomy in production, group membership and leisure
time, have positive and significant impact on women’s health status in the study area.
Using household panel data from Bangladesh, Rahman (2013) argues that there is gender
disparity in intrahousehold allocation of food, particularly micronutrients. He specifically expanded on the work of Pitt et al. (1990), who focused on calories and applied the unitary model
of the household to conclude that the gender disparity in intrahousehold food allocation in
developing countries is partly attributable because of the inequalities in energy requirements
of men and women for their occupation. Rahman (2013) concludes that micronutrients are
allocated unequally in the household among children, and pregnant and lactating women, by
showing that a wife’s bargaining power relative to her husband’s affects the nutrient allocations of their household members significantly and positively. He suggests that increasing the
bargaining power of women through policy changes might be instrumental to achieve positive
nutrition and health outcomes of household members, particularly for the women and their
children.
It has also been shown that women who have the control over household expenditure
allocate more towards children and this affects outcomes up to a threshold. Gitter and Barham
(2008) use randomized experimental data from a social safety net program in Nicaragua
that makes conditional transfer payment to the female head of household to examine the
impact of women’s bargaining power, proxied by their years of schooling relative to men, on
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children’s school enrollment. They find that women’s bargaining power affects how resources
are allocated in the household and this results in school enrollment, although school enrollment
declines when women’s power greatly exceeds that of their husbands. Their results suggest
that it is effective to target transfers to women as evidenced by increases in food expenditures
in the household and school enrollment of children.
Despite the challenge in showing that women’s bargaining power causally affects development outcomes, particularly women’s well being and that of their children, these studies
provide strong evidence in support of this association. One area that remains under researched
is the likelihood that intra-household bargaining power influences the willingness to pay for
or the adoption of new agricultural technologies. Such relationship, which is one of the main
premises of this study, could provide useful information on how to design agricultural interventions such as biofortification.

3

Methodology

3.1

Choice Experiment

I use the choice experiment valuation technique to elicit consumer willingness to pay for OFSP
in northern and upper east regions of Ghana. The choice experiment suits this study because
it allows for the estimation of potential consumer demand for a multi-attribute product that
is spurred by nutritional value to be studied and the bargaining power hypothesis to be tested
at the same time. The advantages of using the choice experiment relative to other valuation
methods includes that I have control over the experiment and the attributes associated with
passive uses that cannot be valued in the market place for a relatively new product. Another
advantage is that choice experiment closely mimics actual purchasing decisions that both
producers and consumers make, and it is based on the random utility theory introduced by
McFadden (1973) and theory of consumer behavior introduced by Lancaster (1966), which
states that the utility derived from a product is because of the attributes of the product.
From some interviews that I conducted and the economic literature, the attributes of
OFSP that warrant investigation in Ghana includes dry matter content, taste, pulp color,
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size of roots, nutritional value, appearance, and price. Although it seems ideal to present all
these attributes to consumers in the experiment, considering all the attributes simultaneously
renders the choice sets unmanageable because they become too large and confusing. Thus,
because of this potential problem, I focus on price and color attributes in this study, and
prepared choice sets based on them. These attributes were varied to create choice scenarios
from which respondents made repeated selection among four alternatives that differed by
these attributes. Price of the sweet potato roots was varied at four levels for each of three
alternative sweet potato differentiated by their pulp color. Color was varied at three levels:
white, yellow and orange.
Since the market for sweet potato is seasonal in northern Ghana and it was out of season
when this experiment was conducted, I relied on information from those that conducted market
surveys on sweet potato in the past year in determining the prices and quantity of sweet potato.
Depending on the season, sweet potato roots are typically sold in the range of 2-4kg heaps
in Ghana, so I resolved to keep the weight constant at 3kg across all varieties. The prices
of the three varieties encompass the possible minimum and maximum price that I received
from those who have knowledge of the sweet potato market. It is also worth noting that the
varieties are not differentiated in prices.
From these attributes and their corresponding levels, I constructed choice sets. The respondents were presented with four choice sets to choose from. The first option was WFSP
and the second option was OFSP, the third was the YFSP and the last option was none of the
three–a none option. In this set-up, there are three sweet potatoes, varied at four different
price levels. This implies that respondents would have to be shown 43 = 64 different choice
sets for the roots experiment. In order to reduce the number of choice sets that respondents
have to choose from, I follow Lusk and Schroeder (2004) and Chowdhury et al (2011) in generating a list of choice sets in such a way that none of the prices are correlated with each
other. This results in 16 choice sets but in order to have a basis for comparison, I included a
17th choice set where all the sweet potatoes have the same price.
Data were collected from respondents via in-person interviews in northern and upper
east regions of Ghana in June 2015. The village contact persons were contacted and the
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permission of village chiefs requested for villagers to be interacted with. The availability of a
respondent determined if the he or she took part in the experiment. To reduce hypothetical
effect of the purchasing decisions and to increase realism, “cheap talk” was employed and
participants were informed that after making their choices, they would receive a gift – “a
key soap” that worth about three Ghana Cedis. Respondents were not paid the value of
the product because payments from past experiences created hysteria in the study areas.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups. One treatment
group received nutritional information about OSFP while the other treatment group did not
receive nutritional information. Participation and assignment was only once and to only one
treatment group. Four well-trained enumerators carried out the survey. Two enumerators
provided nutritional information about OFSP to consumers (treatment 1) and the other two
enumerators did not provide nutritional information (treatment 2). The enumerators first
collected demographic information of the respondents and then elicited their preferences about
the sweet potatoes, providing nutritional information if required.
The experimental sequence of steps are as follows: 1) Randomization 2) Demographic
module 3) Provision of nutritional information if applicable, and 4) Choice experiment itself.
The study sites were randomly selected from a list of villages that have been selected as pilot sites for the works of a team of researchers from the International Potato center. Four
villages were selected in the northern region and additional four villages were selected in the
upper east region, making a total of eight villages for the study. The villages are Nayoku,
Golinga, Voggu-Kushibu and Dimabi in the northern region, and Binduri, Naaga, Gaani and
Damentenga in the Upper east region. These villages are representative of the two regions.
The demographic module consists of a series of survey questions that collected information on
respondents demographics and proxies of intra-household bargaining power such as income,
educational level, amount of land owned, household size and age, which were used as determinants WTP in the empirical estimation. The demographic module was followed by provision
of nutritional information. Consumers that were assigned to the information treatment were
provided information on the nutritional benefits of OFSP while those that were assigned to
treatment without information were not provided nutritional information. The nutritional
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message given to the information treatment was similar to the one used by Chowdhury et al.
(2011), Harvestplus and the International Potato Center. All consumers were asked about
whether they had received prior information on OFSP and their responses are used as a determinant of WTP for OFSP in the empirical estimation. Finally, respondents were given
instructions on how the choice experiment works and provided with scenarios to make their
choices.

3.2

Conceptual Model

The conceptual framework of this study is rooted in the works of Lancaster (1966) and McFadden (1973). Lancaster proposed that consumer demand for a product is spurred by the
attributes of that product while McFadden proposed the random utility theory which assumes
that an individual’s utility comprises of systematic and stochastic components. In this case
where respondents were asked to choose between three different sweet potato varieties and a
none option, I assume that the utility derived by the i th consumer in choosing option sweet
potato j is given by

Uij = Vij + ij

(1)

where Vij is the systematic component of the utility function determined by the attributes
of the sweet potato and ij is the unobserbale stochastic component. The probability that a
consumer chooses alternative j is

P rob{Vij + ij } ≥ P rob{Vik + ik };

f or all j 6= k

(2)

Assuming ij is independently and identically distributed across the j alternatives and
N individuals with an extreme value distribution, the conditional logit results (Lusk and
Schroeder, 2004; Louviere et al., 2000; McFadden, 1973). Based on these assumptions, the
probability of choosing alternative j is
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expVj
P rob{j is chosen} = Pj
Vk
k=1 exp

(3)

where Vij is as previously defined and j is the sweet potato options. The objective of
this study is to estimate consumer willingness to pay for OFSP and to examine the determinants of consumer willingness to pay for OFSP. In order to do this, we need an econometric
specification.

3.3

Econometric Specification

Each respondent chooses one option from four alternatives (OFSP, WFSP, YFSP or ’none’),
which they prefer most (derived highest utility from) in each of the five choice sets for the
roots. I assume that these choices are driven by an attribute-based utility function as specified
below:

Vij = β1 OF SPj + β2 W F SPj + β3 Y F SPj + αPj + γXi + θZi

(4)

where OF SPj takes the value of 1 if alternative j is an OFSP, W F SPj takes the value of 1
if alternative j is a WFSP, Y F SPj takes the value of 1 if alternative j is YFSP, β1 , β2 and β3
are alternative-specific constants representing the utility of orange-, white- and yellow-fleshed
sweet potato relative to ’none’ option, respectively, Pi is the price of alternative j, Xi is a
vector of the demographic characteristics of respondent i and γ is the effect of the demographic
characteristics, Zi is a vector of bargaining power proxies of respondent i and θ is the effect
of the bargaining power proxies on the deterministic component of the utility. The null
hypothesis of the study is that θ is zero, while the alternative is that θ is non zero; however
the direction of the effect is not specified.
Following the parameter estimation is the calculation of the willingness to pay (WTP)
for the attribute of the sweet potato varieties, which is the marginal rate of substitution
between the attributes and price. In other words, according to Naico and Lusk (2010), the
WTP for option j relative to option k is the price difference between j and k predicted to
generate indifference between the two options. Holding all other attributes constant, WTP
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for sweet potato relative to ’none’ is W T P = −β/α and Marginal WTP is: W T Pa − W T Pb =
(βa − βb )/α.

4

Results

4.1

Summary Statistics

The sample for the study comprise of 628 individuals. The summary statistics of the respondents’ demographic characteristics are reported in Table 1 and are disaggregated by gender.
For the full sample of 628 individuals, 52 percent of the respondents are female and the
average age of the respondents is 40 years. Most of the respondents received very little (lower
primary) or no formal education, which can be attributed to the sites of the study. The study
was conducted in rural villages in the northern and upper east regions of Ghana. The reported
average household size is 14 with 4 children and 1 pregnant or lactating mother. The average
monthly income of a household is GHC 204 and the average monthly personal contribution
of a respondent to the household income is GHC 104. On average, the total land area owned
by a respondent is 4.15 acres and the total land area that the respondent do not own but has
access to is 2.88 acres. Most (72 percent) of the respondents have received information on
OSFP prior to the choice experiment.
Furthermore, respondent demographics are disaggregated by gender and treatment. The
differences in characteristics by gender indicate the difference in roles of men and women in the
study areas and also calls for improvement to women’s access to education, personal income
and land, which I use as proxies for their bargaining power in the household. In particular,
on average, women (1.32) are less educated than men (1.63) and they contribute on average
GHC 75 to their household income while men contribute GHC 135. Women also own less
land, 2.85 acres compared to 5.54 acres of men. They also reported to have access only to
1.62 acres of land, which they do not own, while men have access to 4.23 acres. These values
are statistically different and thus showcase the disparity in empowerment between men and
women in this part of the world.
With regard to the disaggregation of the sample by treatment, 300 respondents received in16

formation about the nutritional benefits of OFSP during the experiment while 328 respondents
did not receive nutritional information during the experiment. The values of the demographic
characteristics indicate that there is no significant difference between the two different treatments with respect to individual demographics. This suggests that the random assignment to
treatment was successful and that there was no systematic bias in respondent selection of the
treatments.

4.2

Consumer Willingness-to-Pay for OFSP

I estimated a restricted version of the econometric model (equation 4) using conditional logit
for the full sample and present the results in Table 2. In order to compare and discuss variations in estimates between male and female respondents and treatments, I estimate conditional
logit models for both male and female subsamples, and the two treatment subsamples. These
results are also presented in Table 2. The independent variables (attributes of sweet potato)
of the models explain more than 60 percent of the variation in the dependent variable (choice
of respondents) as indicated by the relative size of the P seudo − R2 in all the models. A total
of 12560 choices were made by the respondents, 6060 choices by male respondents and 6500
choices by female respondents.
For the full sample, the price coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, meaning
that sweet potato options with higher prices were more likely to be chosen even though the
coefficient does not have statistical power. The price coefficient for the male subsample is
negative but statistically insignificant, which means that male respondent were less likely
to choose sweet potato options with higher prices although the coefficient does not have
explanatory power. For the female subsample, the price coefficient is positive and statistically
significant, which implies that female respondents were more likely to choose sweet potato
options with higher prices than options with lower prices. Both the negative and positive signs
of the price coefficient have intuitive interpretation. A negative price coefficient suggests a
downward sloping demand curve as expected while the positive price coefficient which suggests
an upward sloping demand curve could be the general perception that a higher price represent
better quality.
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Table 2 also shows the different coefficients for the three alternative sweet potatoes. The
results are similar for the full sample and the disaggregated sample. All the coefficients are
positive and statistically significant, which shows that the respondents were more likely to
choose either the OFSP, WFSP or YFSP relative to the “none” option. The sizes of the
coefficients show that OFSP is preferred to WFSP and YFSP because the coefficents of the
OFSP for the full sample and subsamples are about two times the coefficients of the WFSP
and YFSP. This can also be interpreted that respondents obtain higher indirect utility from
OFSP relative to the other alternatives. For instance, the coefficient of OSFP in the full
sample is approximately 9 while the coefficients of the YFSP and WFSP are approximately
4 respectively. This result shows that choosing OFSP rather YFSP and WFSP increases
indirect utility obtained by the consumer by about 5 units. A more intuitive interpretation
of these coefficients is obtained through willingness to pay estimates as done in the following
section.
Table 3 presents WTP estimates for male respondents, which are derived from conditional
logit estimates discussed above. Only estimates for the male respondents are used because
a positive price coefficient results in undefined ETP estimates. The WTP estimates indicate
that holding other attributes constant, consumers are willing to pay significantly more for
OFSP than both the WFSP and YFSP, which suggests that OFSP will be quite competitive
in the market when fully introduced. The total WTP for OFSP is more than two times
the total WTP for WFSP and YFSP for male subsample, and perhaps for the full and the
female subsamples. The total WTP stated by male consumers is significantly high, which
could be linked to the differences in personal contribution to household income stated by
men and women in the sample. However, these values seem relatively high maybe due to the
hypothetical nature of the experiment. But as noted by Lusk and Schroeder (2004), marginal
WTP estimates are still very reliable in such circumstance. The marginal WTP for OFSP
versus WFSP, and OFSP versus YFSP, are GHC29 and GHC28 respectively, which represent
over 55% more value for the OFSP. This suggests that the OSFP is likely to have a price
advantage in the market.
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4.3

Determinants of OFSP Acceptance

Table 4 presents estimated coefficients of conditional logit models that examine the effect of
bargaining power proxies of amount of land owned, education, personal contribution to household income, and demographic characteristics of household size and age, as well nutritional
information, on consumer willingness to pay for OFSP.
The proxies of bargaining power appear to negatively influence consumer willingness to
pay for OFSP. The coefficient of personal contribution to household income is negative and
statistically significant for the full sample. It is also negative but less significant for the male
and female subsamples. This suggests that an increase in the respondents’ income may lead
to a decrease in their willingness to pay for OFSP. This is expected given that OFSP is a
primary staple crop in the study area and an increase in income could be allocated to other
foods such as milk and meat. It is notable that the size of the income in relatively small, and
it is about 0.0008. The coefficient of amount of land owned is also negative and statistically
significant for the full sample, and negative but not statistically significant for the male and
female subsamples. This result also suggest that an increase in the amount of land owned
may lead to a decrease in consumer willingness to pay for OFSP. Similarly, respondents who
reported that they have received some form of formal education seem to be less likely to
pay more for OFSP given the negative sign of the coefficient of education, although it is not
statistically significant for the full sample and female subsample. Income, land ownership and
education from the literature are good indicators of intra-household bargaining power. Thus
their sole increase in the household from the above results could lead to a decrease in the
demand for OFSP in the market.
Demographic characteristics of age and household size appear to positively influence consumer willingness to pay for OFSP. The coefficient of household size is positive and statistically
significant for the full sample and the female subsample. This implies that an increase in household size seem to increase consumer willingness to pay for OFSP. Respondents with bigger
households are likely to pay more for the OFSP relative to those with smaller households. This
may have coincided with the need for more foods including sweet potatoes by bigger households. This finding is similar with the age of the respondent. The coefficient of age is positive
19

but not statistically significant for the full sample. It is however significant (and positive) for
the female subsample but insignificant and negative for the male subsample. In general, older
respondents are likely to pay more for the OFSP than younger respondents. In general, these
results suggest that an increase in both the age and household size of respondents may lead
to increase demand for OFSP in the market.
Providing nutritional information appears to very important. The coefficient of the dummy
variable about receiving nutritional information prior to the experiment is positive, highly statistically significant and large for the full sample and the male and female subsamples. This
result is expected given the role promotional campaigns have been found to have in introducing new products in different spheres of life. It could be inferred from this result that accompanying nutritional campaign with the dissemination of OFSP could lead to its successful
introduction. Specifically, accompanying interventions that aim to increase intra-household
bargaining power of women with nutritional campaign about OFSP could lead to both increase in household wellbeing and successful adoption and consumption of OFSP. That health
information may play an role joint interventions (empowerment and OFSP dissemination)
is suggested by the magnitude of the estimated information coefficients across the samples
which will completely mitigate the negative effects from the increases in empowerment. For
instance, the sum of the information, income, land owned and education coefficients equals:
0.8182 − 0.0008 − 0.0395 − 0.1771 = 0.6008, which is still a sizable effect. This finding is
consistent with some of the literature on the impact of health information on food demand.
Kinnucan et al. (1997) find that health information has a significant effect on meat demand
in the United States, where cholesterol-related health information was widely disseminated.
Similar results were obtained by Chowdhury et al. (2011) and Naico and Lusk (2010) for OFSP
in Uganda and Mozambique respectively, and for biofortified cassava in Nigeria by Oparinde
et al. (2014).
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5

Conclusions and Implication

Are consumers willing to pay for OFSP? How much are they willing to pay? What are
their total and marginal willingness to pay for OFSP? What are the determinants of their
willingness to pay for OFSP? Is gender, particularly household bargaining power, a significant
determinant of their willingness to pay for OFSP? What is the effect of providing information
about the nutritional benefits of OFSP on consumers willingness to pay? Several conditional
logit models of consumers’ attribute-based utility functions were estimated to answer these
research questions using data from a choice experiment conducted in Ghana. The conditional
model estimates were used to estimate total and marginal WTP and determine the influence
of intra-household bargaining power, demographic characteristics and nutritional information
on consumer willingness to pay for OFSP.
Results show that consumers valued the OFSP more than the WFSP and the YFSP.
Specifically, consumers valued the OFSP about 50% more than the WFSP and the YFSP as
indicated by stated marginal WTP. These findings are consistent with consumer preferences
studies carried out by Naico and Lusk (2010) and Chowdhury et al. (2011), and suggest that
choice experiment is a plausible technique for eliciting consumers’ preferences. Intra-household
bargaining power proxies of education, amount of land owned and personal contribution to
household income appear to influence consumer WTP for OFSP significantly but negatively.
This suggests that attempts to increase in any of the bargaining power proxies alone may
result in decrease in WTP for OFSP and thus translate to decreased demand for OFSP in
the market. Conversely, results show that providing consumers with nutritional information
could translate to sizable premiums for OFSP as indicated by the highly significant positive
coefficients obtained in the conditional models for the full sample and the male and female
subsamples. These results suggest that OFSP dissemination programs should incorporate
nutritional information campaigns. It seems possible to empower households and successfully
introduce OFSP simultaneously if empowerment interventions are incorporated with nutritional information campaigns.
In general, results suggest that OFSP will be quite competitive in the market when fully
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introduced. Thus the OFSP intervention offer the potential of reducing the prevalence of
vitamin A deficiency through a pro-poor and cost-effective means. Providing consumers with
information about the nutritional benefits of OFSP and other biofortified crops appears to be
more crucial in the successful introduction of OFSP and other biofortified foods.
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a

Reported statistics are mean values. b The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Respondent Demographics by Gender and Treatment
Variable Definition
Full Sample
Gender
Treatment
Male
Female With info Without Info
Gender
1-female, 0-male
0.52a
0
1
0.49
0.55
b
(0.50)
(0)
(0)
(0.50)
(0.50)
Age
Age in years
40.23
39.38
41.03
42.18
38.55
(15.95)
(15.65) (16.25)
(16.96)
(14.72)
Edu
From 1-No formal education
1.47
1.63
1.32
1.40
1.52
to 6-Higher education
(1.17)
(1.36)
(0.96)
(1.08)
(1.24)
Hsize
Number of people
14.37
15.07
13.72
15.60
13.27
in a household
(9.57)
(10.02)
(9.09)
(10.76)
(8.14)
Csize
Number of children
3.93
4.32
3.58
3.91
3.96
under 5 years
(2.69)
(2.96)
(2.35)
(2.78)
(2.59)
Pbsize
Number of pregnant/
1.23
1.30
1.17
1.11
1.34
breastfeeding women
(1.42)
(1.40)
(1.42)
(1.41)
(1.42)
Hincome Household income
203.76
260.64
150.73
171.83
232.94
in GHC/month
(258.21)
(331.16) (144.75) (187.54)
(305.69)
Cincome Contribution to household
103.83
134.80
74.96
84.50
121.82
income in GHC/month
(126.85)
(155.93) (82.12)
(105.15)
(141.26)
Lowned Total area of land
4.15
5.54
2.85
4.02
4.27
owned in acres
(3.42)
(3.82)
(2.36)
(3.48)
(3.35)
Laccess
Total area of land not owned
2.88
4.23
1.62
3.87
1.97
but accessed in acres
(3.43)
(4.03)
(2.07)
(3.55)
(3.03)
Pinfo
Received information on OFSP
1.28
1.17
1.37
1.27
1.29
prior to experiment, 1-yes, 2-No
(0.45)
(0.37)
(0.49)
(0.45)
(0.45)
N
Number of Respondents
628
303
325
300
328

27
∗∗∗

Statistically significant at 1% level. c The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Table 2: Conditional Logit Estimates of the Utility Function by Gender
Variable
Definition
Full Sample
Gender
rchoice
choice made by respondent
Male
Female
rprice
price of the sweet potato
0.0588
–0.0596
0.1481∗∗∗
(0.0453)c
(0.0690)
(0.0601)
roptiona
white-flesh sweet potato
3.9818∗∗∗
3.6818∗∗∗
4.3974∗∗∗
(0.5936)
(0.7376)
(1.0166)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
roptionb
orange-flesh sweet potato
8.8609
8.9658
8.9301∗∗∗
(0.5906)
(0.7334)
(1.0130)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
roptionc
yellow-flesh sweet potato
3.9496
3.8471
4.2289∗∗∗
(0.5940)
(0.7373)
(1.0175)
Summary Statistics
Obs
number of choices
12560
6060
6500
N
number of respondents
628
303
325
L
Log-likelihood
-2416.2145 -1029.6328 -1340.9326
R2
Pseudo-R2
0.6551
0.6932
0.6279
6000
300
-148.1744
0.9554

6560
328
-1883.9945
0.4820

and Treatment
Treatment
With info Without Info
– 0.2307
0.0765
(0.1976)
(0.0480)
15.9764
3.9439∗∗∗
(852.5632)
(0.5960)
25.4451
7.4473∗∗∗
(852.5632)
(0.5926)
16.0028
3.91164∗∗∗
(852.5632)
(0.5960)

Table 3: Willingness to Pay (WTP) for OFSP
Male Respondents
Total WTP (GHC)
White
21
Orange
50
Yellow
22
Marginal WTP (GHC)
Orange versus White
29 (58%)
Orange versus Yellow
28 (56%)
White versus Yellow
-1 (-4%)
c

The numbers in parentheses are the percentage change over the second variety.
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Table 4: Determinants of OFSP Acceptance by Gender
Variable Definition
Full Sample
Gender
choice made by respondent
Male
Female
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
orange-flesh sweet potato attribute
4.6301
5.6042
4.0127∗∗∗
(0.2098)
(0.3407)
(0.3025)
∗∗
∗
personal contribution to household income −0.0008
−0.0009
–0.0008
(0.0004)
(0.0005)
(0.0008)
amount of land owned
−0.0395∗∗
–0.0280
−0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0182)
(0.0250)
(0.0316)
education
–0.1771
−0.3617∗
–0.1081
(0.1593)
(0.2179)
(0.2460)
∗∗
household size
0.0157
0.0047
0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0070)
(0.0096)
(0.0106)
age in years
0.0052
–0.0032
0.0119∗∗
(0.00367)
(0.0057)
(0.0051)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
informed about OFSP prior to experiment
0.8182
0.5435
0.9157∗∗∗
(0.1213)
(0.2062)
(0.1608)
Summary Statistics
number of choices
12560
6060
6500
number of respondents
628
303
325
Log-likelihood
-2518.9532 -1073.8153 -1398.1987
2
Pseudo-R
0.6404
0.6801
0.6120
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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